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From Reluctancy to Activity. Finland's Way
to the Nordic Family during 1920's and 1930's
Leena Kaukiainen
Finland, who had gained her independence as recently as the end of 1917, was
drawn only gradually into cooperation with the other Nordic countries. Did she
play a positive role of her own in this process or was she rather a passively reactive
participant, a kind of isolated stepdaughter in the Nordic family of nations who only
reluctantly adapted herself to her new siblings?
1. The earlier phases of Nordic cooperation
Because of the close kinship existing between their languages Sweden, Norway and
Denmark were natural partners in cooperative ventures but nevertheless, matters
sometimes proved complicated. Each particular country had her own special
characteristics while attempts at political cooperation had for various reasons all
too often come to nothing. Norway had earlier been a part of Denmark and had
since 1814 been joined with Sweden in a union, which, however, ended in mutual
disappointment. "Scandinavianism", the dominant politico-romantic movement
in the 19th century as well as any plans for Nordic union received a fatal setback in
1864 as a result of the German-Danish War when Denmark failed to get the support
from her sister nations she felt entitled to receive.
Cooperation between the three nations certainly continued, in the 1880's at a
functional level in the form of academic collaboration and within the literary and
artistic movements. The cultural periodical "Norden. Illustreret skandinavisk
Revue" (The Nordic Countries. Illustrated Scandinavian Review) which was
published in 1886—87 had subscribers not merely in Sweden, Norway and Den-
mark but also in Finland.1
1 H. Nielsen, Nordens Enhed gennem Tiderne, vol. 2 (København—Oslo—Stockholm, 1938), pp. 305-307.
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Finland, which had previously been an integral part of Sweden, occupies a
particularly interesting role in this picture. Although in 1809 she had been incorpo-
rated into the Russian empire as an autonomous Grand Duchy she had retained a
legislative and an administrative system that dated from the Swedish period.
Swedish continued to be the language of administration and cultural life while
Sweden herself was generally considered by the educated classes to be a bridge to
the rest of Europe. It was now, however, that Finland for the first time was "elevated
to membership in the family of nations" and in the course of time began to develop
her own distinctive national culture although this Finnish development was not
widely recognized in Sweden. There admiration for the Finnish people tended to be
based on the romantic accounts emanating from Finnish authors writing in Swedish
while the effects of Russian influence in the country were often greatly exaggerated.2
Because of such favourable attitudes in Sweden and the other Scandinavian
countries Finland now became "adopted" as a participant in various forms of
Scandinavian cultural cooperation. Finnish schoolteachers for example regularly
participated from 1868 onwards in Scandinavian school congresses.3
Finland gained a new emphasis as a topic of discussion in Sweden at the
beginning of the 1890's when Russian foreign policy seemed bent on general
territorial expansion and it was generally believed that that expansion even
embraced territorial aspirations in Scandinavia itself. This was particularly evident
in 1899 when the Russian government launched actions for the russification of
Finland that actually ignored her constitutional laws. This began the phase known
in Finnish history as the Period of First Oppression. In Sweden fears were expressed
that Russia might aim at expanding via Sweden to the Atlantic and a similar
"Russian peril" aroused anxiety in Norway.4
In this national emergency Finns needed all the support they could get. Many
Finns, expelled by the Russians, moved over to Sweden and instigated there anti-
Russian subversive activities which provided Sweden with a delicate problem.3
Although Denmark is at some distance from Finland geographically, even there
feelings of understanding for Finland's position were readily expressed in view of the
fact that at this same time Germany had begun a resolute germanization of the
Danish-speaking areas in Schleswig that had been earlier conquered by Prussia.
With such an atmosphere prevailing a Nordic association, "Nordisk Förening",
was set up in the early spring of 1899 in Copenhagen.6 Already at the beginning of
the 1890's some Finnish politicians had tried to influence the policy of the Russian
empire through Copenhagen. As is widely known, the Empress Maria Feodorovna
2 M. Klinge, Bernadotten ja Leninin välissä. Tutkielmia kansallisista aiheista (Juva, 1975), pp. 10—23,
84—91;V. Voionmaa, Suomen uusi asema (Porvoo, 1919), pp. 190—191.
3 V. T. Rosenqvist, "De nordiska skolmötena och Finland", Nordisk Tidskrift (1925), pp. 270-278.
4 F. Lindberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia 3:4, 1872-1914 (Stockholm, 1958), pp. 109-123.
5 S. Eskola, Suomen kysymys ja Ruotsin mielipide. Ensimmäisen maailmansodan puhkeamisesta Venäjän
maaliskuun vallankumoukseen (Porvoo, 1965), pp. 13—14.
6 Nielsen, op. cit., pp. 394-414.
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was a daughter of the Danish King, and her brother Crown Prince Frederik of
Denmark discreetly acted as a spokesman for Finland, with the Finnish-born
teacher of the Crown Prince's children acting as an intermediary.7
The publication of a periodical "Nordisk Revy. Tidskrift for Norden rörande
politiska och kulturella spörsmål" (The Nordic Review. A Periodical for the Nordic
countries on political and cultural life) in 1903—04 can be considered only as a
short-lived manifestation of orientation to a Nordic viewpoint. As time passed the
earlier enthusiasm diminished, the most influential single factor in this decline
being the crisis between Sweden and Norway over their union which eventually led
to the independence of Norway in 1905.
From the point of view of Nordic cooperation the period before the outbreak of the
First World War saw contradictory trends, sometimes towards cooperation and
sometimes towards renewed "separatism". Economic cooperation, for example the
possibility of a customs union for the three Scandinavian countries, was indeed
discussed; but the "Nordisk Forening for økonomisk Samarbejde" (The Nordic
Association for Economic Cooperation) which was set up in 1904 for promoting that
plan remained largely, however, an organisation on paper only. From the Finnish
standpoint it is worth mentioning that circles in the woodmanufacturing and
printing industries launched a number of joint Nordic periodicals and that some
Finnish enterprises participated in these ventures.8
After 1905 the most significant form of cooperation lay in the Nordic Interpar-
liamentary Group and its annual meetings of members of the Nordic parliaments
which started in 1907. Although Finland had after the 1906 Parliamentary reform
the most democratic representative institution in Europe the participation of Fin-
nish delegates became very difficult once the Russians had launched a new period of
oppression. Events in Finland and Schleswig caused something of a revival of
"Neo-Scandinavianism" among youth in the North. University and gymnasium
students held meetings annually and at the 1914 conference in Helsinki the founda-
tions were laid for the "Nordisk Studenter- og Gymnasiastforening" (The Nordic
Association of University and Gymnasium Students) which spoke in its programme
of "the spiritual and brotherly unity of the North."9
The outbreak of the First World War also brought many problems to the neutral
Nordic countries. Political cooperation among the Scandinavian countries was
restricted to a joint declaration on neutrality issued in the early stages of the war, a
joint manifesto of protest against violations of neutrality in November 1914 and a
meeting of the three monarchs of Scandinavia to give further emphasis to those
policies. Otherwise each particular country concentrated on safeguarding its own
7 T.  Torvinen, Suomen puolustusta Kööpenhaminassa.  Ina Langen salainen toiminta Danielson—
Kalmarinasiamiehenä 1890—luvun alussa. (Porvoo, 1967), passim.
8 Since 1895 Nordisk Papir-Tidende. Central-Organ for Papirfabrikation, Bogtrykkeri, Boghandel og
Bogbinderi i Danmark, Norge, Sverige og Finland. Nielsen, op. cit., p. 333-384, 415-421, 438.
9 Nielsen, Nordens Enhed gennem Tideme, vol. 3, pp. 39-41, 62-66. Cf. also Knud Larsen, "Scandinavian
Grass Roots", Scandinavian Journal of History, vol. 9:3 (1984).
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basic welfare and it was only towards the end of the war, in 1917, that economic
cooperation began again mainly in the form of a mutual exchange of goods.10
2. Finland's achievement of independence and its attendant problems
The outbreak of the First World War created the required conditions in Finland for
a reassessment of her relationship with Russia, the outcome of which was an
independence movement aimed at her separation from the Empire by collaboration
with Russia's enemy, Germany.
Sweden had her own particular role to play in these plans. Indeed, the original
goal of the independence movement was to get Sweden militarily involved in the
realigning of Finland's position. In particular the Swedish press was considered to
be of value from a propaganda point of view. However, collaboration with those
Swedish activists who had similar aims collapsed in the autumn of 1915. The work
of the activist movement in Finland was itself delayed and the enthusiasm of the
Swedish activists had already passed its peak. Yet, the efforts of the Finns were not
wasted, for one has to acknowledge it as a significant achievement that the Swedish
authorities never interfered in the operations of the activists and their supporters. In
addition the extremely influential press of the Swedish Social Democratic party,
although itself pro-Entente, remained silent about the activities of the Finnish
liberation movement, the Jägers. As a result Finnish young men were able to travel
via Sweden to their German training camps for secret military training without
their movements ever being disclosed."
The Russian revolutions opened the way to the promulgation of Finnish inde-
pendence on December 6th 1917. It was recognized by Sweden on January 4th 1918
and by Norway and Denmark six days later. However, during the Finnish Civil
War, which began at the end of January, opinion in Sweden was very divided.
Controversy over the future of the Aland Islands arose at a time when a new
"Greater Swedish" activism was reaching its zenith and as a result the relationship
between Finland and Sweden at a political level became aggravated while tension
was exacerbated by separatism among the Aland islanders who wished to join
Sweden. Sweden was not unwilling to accede to this request while the Finnish
government could not agree to the cession of an archipelago that had hitherto been
part  of  her  territory.  An  escape  from  this  impasse  was  achieved  only  after  an
Investigation Commission appointed by the League of Nations recommended in
favour of Finland, a recommendation which formed the basis of the resolution of
June 24th 1921. The group of islands was demilitarized and given local autonomy
by the Aland Islands Convention signed on October 20th 1921.12
10 Nielsen, vol. 3, pp. 67-76, 102, 115-125.
11 Eskola, op. cit., pp. 37-47, 78-186.
12 V. Rasila, Suomen poliittinen historia 1809-1975.2: 1905-1919 (Porvoo, 1976), pp. 61-69; J. Kalela,
Grannar på skilda vägar. Det finlandsk-svenska samarbetet i den finländsk och svensk utrikespolitiken
1921—1923 (Borgå, 1971), pp. 43-79; H. Tingsten, Svensk utrikesdebatt mellan världskrigen (Lund,
1964), pp. 89-148; J. Barros, The Åland Island Question (Clinton, Mass, 1968), passim.
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The solution of the dispute over the Aland Islands was followed with keen interest
in Norway, the neighbour with whom Finland had a joint northern border, and
general opinion there tended to favour Sweden rather than Finland.13 This interest
was in part stimulated by the Norwegian claim to be the true owner of Spitsbergen
as well as by a general desire on the part of both Finland and Norway to extend their
territory at the expense of Soviet-Russia. Finland sought a port on the Arctic Ocean
and on the basis of the peace treaty signed with Soviet-Russia in Tartu in 1920 she
was ceded the Pechenga area, a grave disappointment to Norway. Norway had
herself wanted to extend her territories in Eastern Varanger and according to her
most far-reaching plans she wanted also to expand into the western arm of Finland
and into the crown of her head, the Utsjoki area. Apart from the economic issues
behind these speculations there was also the question of the Finns who had moved to
the Finnmark area of Norway. Norway suspected their loyalty and aimed at their
"norwegianization". Finland on the other hand wished to defend the rights of these
people of Finnish stock to use their native tongue. Thus in the minds of the
Norwegians Finland had inherited from Russia the image of a state intent on
expansion into Finnmark and towards the Atlantic.14
During the early stages of her independence Finland was naturally in great need
of support, but she did not primarily seek that from the other Nordic countries.
While Sweden and Norway belonged to the British camp in the League of Nations
Finland preferred closer relations with France and directed her attention also to the
Baltic states belonging to the group of Border States led by Poland. However, this
political orientation towards the South soon collapsed when in 1922 the Finnish
parliament did not ratify the Warsaw Pact although it had already been signed by
the parties concerned.15
The door to the East was closed, so the only remaining possibility for cooperation
lay with the Nordic countries even though the political relationships with them were
still at a merely formal level.
This was not at all due to lack of suitors. On the contrary it was the Maiden
Finland herself who seemed to be indifferent to advances. For Sweden an orienta-
tion towards Scandinavia seemed Finland's natural foreign political choice and the
ill-feeling engendered by the Aland Islands dispute had now deliberately been
13 Finnish Envoy in Kristiania Serlachius to Acting Foreign Minister Ehrnrooth 19 March 1919, nr. 661;
Envoy Thesleff to Foreign Minister Holsti 16 November 1919, nr. 2098. Foreign Ministry 5 C 4:1.
National Archives. Helsinki.
14 K. E. Eriksen—E. Niemi, Den finske fart. Sikkerhetsproblemer og minoritetspolitikk i Nord 1860-1940
(Oslo—Bergen—Troms0, 1981), pp. 26—176; M. Jokipii, Ruijan suomalaisasutuksen historian
päälinjoja/ Finsk bosetning i Nord-Norge—historiske hovedlinjer (Suomalaiset Jäämeren rannoilla.
Siirtolaisinstituutti, Turku, 1982),passim.
15 The Warsaw Pact, signed 17 March 1922, was not a military but a political, consultative agreement.
H. Schauman, Reunavaltiopolitiikka (Itsenäisen Suomen ulkopolitiikan alkutaival. Historian Aitta, vol. 15.
Porvoo 1962), pp. 121-144; E. Jutikkala, 'Ensimmäinen tasavalta' {1919-1945) (Suomen poliittinen
historia, vol. 2, Porvoo, 1979), pp. 126-129; Kalela, op. cit., 59-97.
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forgotten. Among those promoting Finnish—Swedish cooperation especially in-
dustrious were two men, Henning Elmqvist, the new Swedish envoy to Helsinki
noted for his close contacts with Finns, and Werner Söderhjelm, the Finnish envoy
to Stockholm. In addition, the King of Sweden, Gustavus V, was willing as early as
1922 to pay a state visit to Finland though this clashed with protocol which
demanded that the President of Finland visit Sweden first, a suggestion which in no
way interested President K. J. Ståhlberg. Such a visit occurred only after there had
been a change of President, in 1925. The new head of state, President Lauri Kr.
Relander became known as an enthusiastic traveller and his state visits contributed
to the creation of a more favourable atmosphere.16
Nevertheless Sweden was not willing to make concessions to Finland, that were
too far-reaching. When Carl Hederstierna, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs
carelessly adverted in an after-dinner speech in 1923 to the possibility of a military
alliance between Finland and Sweden he was compelled to resign.17
3. Nationalism and the language question
The reasons for Finnish reluctance could be found not only in her foreign political
orientation but also in the struggle between the ethno-linguistic groupings within
her own boundaries. Linguistic nationalism had already materialized during the
19th century and among the Swedish speaking gentlefolk it was connected with
Social-Darwinistic feelings of superiority to the Finnish speaking common people.
The parliamentary reform of 1906 brought a decrease in the power of the Swedish-
speaking upper class and on the other hand an increase in the influence of the
general Finnish-speaking population. The Finnish nationalistic movement deman-
ded a finnification of the country's cultural life in proportion to the scale of
Finnish-speaking in the total population. The Swedish-speakers held their ground
and the most radical of them ended as supporters of the "East-Swedish" movement,
which aimed first at the separation of Swedish-speaking areas into cantons and later
into autonomous parts of Finland. This separatism had its strongest foothold
among the Swedish-speaking population in Southern Ostrobothnia and following
the example of the Aland islanders some of its supporters made proposals concern-
ing a referendum on reunion with Sweden. Sweden, however, was not interested in
this prospect while the majority of Swedish-speakers on the Finnish mainland
wanted in any case to retain their Finnish citizenship. Equal status with Finnish-
speakers was not, however, enough to satisfy the East-Swedish movement, which
now aimed at strengthening the privileges of the Swedish-speaking population. It
succeeded to the extent that in the language statutes of 1921 and 1922 each citizen of
Finland was guaranteed the right to an education in his mother-tongue and the
right to carry on all his business with courts and government offices in that same
16 Kalela, op. cit., 75, 77, 105-109, 141 - 142, 171 -173; L. Ehrnrooth, Från ett skiftesrikt liv (Helsingfors,
1947), p. 317.
17 Kalela, op. cit., pp. 204, 219; Tingsten, op. cit., pp. 155-161.
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tongue, and this right was valid for each individual citizen not just for groups or
particular localities. In practice it led to the creation of mono or bilingual communal
government on the basis of linguistical distribution in a particular locality. By
international standards the language legislation of Finland was very liberal indeed,
and the position of the minority well guaranteed. The East-Swedish group as a
political movement withered away in 1923, but controversies like that over biling-
ualism in the University of Helsinki still lay in the future.18
The new constitution and language laws did not, however, produce total national
harmony. Issues concerning education and culture could still lead to strong agita-
tion, which finally resulted in the establishment of new private universitites for each
of the language groups. The Åbo Akademi in Turku opened its doors to Swedish
students in 1919 and three years later the same town became the seat of a university
for Finnish-speakers. The state university in Helsinki was bilingual. Nevertheless
the Finnish-speakers who saw it as the home of Finnish culture felt dismayed by the
strong position which the Swedish language still occupied inside it. Indeed accord-
ing to them the University was the greatest stronghold of Swedishness in the whole
of Finland.
According to the Helsinki University Act passed in 1923 the proportional amount
of teaching in either language at the University in different faculties had to corres-
pond to the ratio of Finnish- and Swedish-speaking students during the previous
three years. Teaching would be provided in both languages and the student's
mother tongue would be used in examinations. The professors holding privately
funded chairs were allowed to choose their teaching language, but at least 15
professors had to lecture in Swedish. Wide-ranging public discussion preceded the
passing of the law and thanks to the activity of Swedish-speakers the issues were
debated also in Sweden. Under the influence of propaganda from Finland many
newspapers in Sweden seemed convinced of the existence of linguistic oppression by
Finnish-speakers; however, the Swedish government did not see eye to eye with
those Swedish-speaking Finns who were attempting to spread such notions.19
Debate following the reform showed that neither side was satisfied with the law.
The growing strength of Finnish nationalism, however, posed a more serious threat
to the relationship between the linguistic groups than did the agitation of the
Swedish-speaking Finns themselves. Finnish nationalism gained strength not merely
from these linguistic antagonisms but also from the new national pride engendered
by the achievement of independence; it was reinforced also by the disappointments
of the Tartu peace treaty, the failure of East Karelian ambitions and the
atmosphere that was the legacy of the Civil War. In the form of an ultra-Finnish
movement it began to gain support especially among young educated Finns and
farmers, but it failed to attract the working class although it aimed at national
18 G. v. BondsdorfT, Svenska folkpartiet. Bakgrund, tillblivelse och utveckling till 1917 (Helsingfors,
1956), passim; v. Bondsdorff, Självstyrelsetanken i fmlandsvensk politik åren 1917—1923 (Helsingfors,
1950), pp.323-347; P. K. Hämälainen, Kielitaistelu Suomessa 1917-1939 (Porvoo, 1968), pp. 37-84.
19 Hämäläinen, op. cit., pp. 86—98.
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integration. For this new movement the strong position of the Swedish language in
Helsinki University and school education as well as the conspicuously high propor-
tion of Swedish-speaking officers in the Finnish Army were still considered as issues
of the first rank.
The vicious circle could be recognised in all nationalistic activities. When com-
plaining about Swedish interference in the internal affairs of Finland the ultra-Finns
readily referred to the treatment of the Finnish population in the Norrbotten of
Sweden, which led in turn to accusations by the Swedes concerning Finnish
interference in her internal affairs. Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen who has studied the
language dispute maintains, however, that the leading national parties used
nationalistic agitation mainly as an effective election ploy and that the nationalistic
programmes remained merely electioneering slogans never intended to get
accepted.20
Not all those Finnish-speaking people with influence were, however, as uncom-
promising as the ultra-Finns. The National Progressive Party (liberals) had rather a
moderate standpoint and the Social-Democrats never did consider the language
question as an issue of importance.21 Thus an eminent Social Democratic politician
and professional historian Väinö Voionmaa declared in his book "Suomen uusi
asema" (The new position of Finland), published in 1919, that "Until general
disarmament became a reality the defence alliance between Finland and Sweden
was as natural as it was necessary; and one could imagine such an alliance to be
more advantageous to Sweden for she would then be in a much more protected
position than Finland. But the greater and higher goal for which Finland and
Sweden should work together, would always be an alliance for peace, cooperation
and the promoting of economic, social and cultural life in the North, especially as
this cooperation had so great geographical and historical justification."22
Similarly among Swedish-speaking Finns with influence there were individuals,
who—like Amos Anderson, the proprietor of the leading Swedish newspaper in
Finland, Hufvudstadsbladet—considered separatism among the Swedish-speakers a
dangerous phenomenon. The Finnish envoy to Stockholm, Werner Söderhjelm
found it annoying that the press in Sweden was continually being provided with
material discussing the hostile attitude Finnish-speakers were supposed to hold
towards the Swedish-speaking population in Finland.23
20 Hämäläinen, op. cit., pp. 98-144; M. Klinge, Ruotsalaisten eristäytymisliike ja aitosuomalaisuus 1920-
luvulla (Kaksi vuosikymmentä Suomen sisäpolitiikkaa 1919-1939. Historian Aitta, vol. 16, Porvoo, 1964),
pp. 132-138; H. Tenertz, Folkupplysningsarbetet i Norrbottens finnbygd under förra hälften av 1900-talet
jämte språkdebatten (Stockholm, 1963), passim.
21 Hämäläinen, op. cit., pp. 142-144, 155-159.
22 Voionmaa, op. cit., p. 200.
23 Hämäläinen, op. cit., pp. 152—155.
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4. The Norden Associations
Already towards the end of the 19th century short-lived associations called "Norden"
(the North) were functioning in different Nordic countries and the last of them only
withered away with the dissolution of the union of Sweden and Norway.
A few years after the outbreak of the First World War the time seemed ripe again
for a fresh attempt. The initiator was a Danish doctor C. Heerfordt, who en-
deavoured to promote the issue, not only in Denmark but also in Sweden and
Norway, by his many writings and by his personal contacts. The Danish Norden
Association was founded in 1917 and by the beginning of the following year the
organising of similar associations was already being discussed in the other two
Scandinavian countries. Many eminent scholars and influential people in cultural
life expressed their support and there was general enthusiasm. The formulation of a
programme proved to be tricky, however, because of the many divergent interests
involved and it seemed necessary to include the encouragement of cultural contacts
as well as economic cooperation. There was also lively discussion on the form of
future activities. Should the associations concentrate on the diffusion of general
information or should the main emphasis be on collaboration between these coun-
tries at a very concrete level? A middle course prevailed and accordingly the Norden
Associations were intended to play a role at the centre of Nordic endeavours as
agents for coordinating joint activities.
At a meeting of representatives from Denmark, Sweden and Norway in Septem-
ber 1918 unanimity was reached on the aims and forms of their activities. The final
organisation was postponed, however, till February 1919 because of the upheavals
during the last phases of the World War. The appeal presented at the organizing
meeting was signed by 104 Danes, 149 Norwegians and 177 Swedes. Local branches
were established in each of the three countries and the first general meeting was held
in May of the same year in Stockolm. There it was agreed to hold a joint meeting of
representatives at least once a year. Between times the leadership and the secretar-
ies of the Associations were to explore necessary and possible opportunities for
Nordic cooperation. The aims of the Associations included the spreading of in-
formation on each of the Nordic countries by means of lectures, meetings, travels
and literature. The yearbook "Nordens Aarbog" was founded as a joint organ and its
first issue was published in 1920.24
The lively economic cooperation between the Scandinavian countries, which had
begun in 1917, decreased with the improvement of conditions after the war. In order
to bring new life to what were now dwindling cooperative efforts it was decided to
establish Joint Delegations for Nordic Economic Cooperation, "Nabolandsnevnden".
Their activities, however, showed no tangible results in spite of many meetings.
From the Finnish standpoint it deserves to be mentioned that F. Raestad, the
Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, tried in 1921 to get Finland involved, but
24 Nielsen, vol. 3, 195-199; A. Houken, Det nye Norden. Det nordiske Samarbejde siden 1914 i kortfattet
fremstilling (Senderborg, 1940), p. 1-34.
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the leaders of the Swedish Foreign Office were not willing to expand Scandinavian
fields of activity in this way, for the outcome of the Aland Islands question was still
too fresh in their minds. These delegations were, however, abolished soon after-
wards, in 1922.25
In spite of this setback Finland was soon participating in Nordic cooperative
activities quite conspicuously, for in the summer of 1922 Helsinki acted as host city
to two Nordic congresses: The Third Nordic Congress of Journalists and the Nordic
Congress of Social Politicians. The former in particular was just what was needed to
dispel mutual suspicions and it was exceptionally well publicized. The same sum-
mer there were Finnish participants also in the First Nordic Congress on Adminis-
tration in Stockholm while Finns also took part in the activities of the Nordic
Interparliamentary Group.
The enterprise of the Swedish envoy to Helsinki, Elmqvist seemed to lie behind
the attempts to make Finland join in the activities of Norden Associations in the
same year. The Swedish Norden Association let it be understood that it had no
objections to Finland's becoming a member and the same opinion was expressed by
the Norwegian and Danish Associations. The envoy had also prepared the ground
in Finland through his personal acquaintance with Leo Ehrnrooth, a bank manager
and a former minister. The leaders of the Swedish People's Party in Finland were,
however, unwilling to appear alongside Finnish-speaking figures even when partici-
pating in forms of Nordic cooperation. So for this reason in spite of the fact that
Swedish-speakers in Finland were willing to see themselves as a "bridge" to
Scandinavia these attempts to found a Norden Association in Finland eventually
came to nothing.26
By the autumn of 1924 this opposition had been so weakened that Finland was
able to join the Norden Association. Yet even now there was a dispute about the
name, for the Finnish-speakers could not agree to the use of the word "finländsk" to
denote all the inhabitants of Finland in the proposed name "Norden, finländsk
föreningen för nordiskt samarbete" (Norden, the Association for Nordic Coopera-
tion of the Inhabitants of Finland). They wanted to replace the offensive term by the
word "finsk" (Finnish) which in turn was totally unacceptable to the Swedish-
speakers. Finally the problem was resolved by using a roundabout expression and
the form emerged "Norden, föreningen i Finland för nordiska samarbetet" (Nor-
den, the Association for Nordic Cooperation in Finland).
The former minister Otto Stenroth was elected chairman of the new association
and Leo Ehrnrooth became vice-chairman.27
The Finnish Association was for long mainly made up of members of the Swedish-
speaking educated classes but among its chairmen there were many eminent
Finnish-speakers, such as Oskari Mantere, the head of the National Board of
25 Kalela, op. cit., pp. 230-232; Nielsen, vol. 3, pp. 222-224.
26 Kalela, op. cit., pp. 238-249; Ehrnrooth, op. cit., pp. 327-328.
27 Ehrnrooth, op. cit., pp. 328-329.
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Schools. In the beginning the number of members amounted to some 150 rising to
500 in four years. However, numbers then began to decrease considerably and it
was not until 1934 they managed to reach 500 again.28
As a gesture of welcome the Swedish Norden Association organized a Finland
Week in Stockholm in March 1925 including various lectures and cultural events
with speakers and performers from Finland. A similar Swedish Week was arranged
in Helsinki the next year.29 Under the auspices of the Norden Associations Swedish
lecturing visits were also arranged in Finland while Finns visited Sweden. In this
connection it might be worth mentioning that in the autumn of 1924 another
society, the "Samfundet Sverige—Finland" (the Sweden—Finland Association)
was founded in Stockholm in succession to the former "Finländska Förening" (the
Finnish Society) for the promotion of cultural links between both countries and it
had approximately five hundred members. Also it is worth bearing in mind that
similar types of cultural exchange took place to some extent between Finland and
Norway.30
Posing particular problems for Nordic cooperation were—and still are—the
uniqueness of the Finnish language and the consequent linguistic isolation of
Finnish-speakers at Nordic meetings partly due to the fact that all the other
participants are able to use their mother tongue while the Finnish-speakers have to
use a foreign language, Swedish, even when communicating with Danes and
Norwegians.
There were discussions in Norden Association circles on how to improve a
knowledge of languages and the arrangement of language courses, but in practice it
resulted in the employment of Norwegian-, Danish- and Swedish-speaking travell-
ing lecturers and the establishment of lecturerships at universities.31 This policy,
however, did not embrace the promotion of the Finnish language, even if that had
been discussed, because it was considered impossible for people in other Nordic
countries to study such a language. At most some Finnish-speaking classes might be
founded in some gymnasiums while summer holidays might be spent in learning to
know Finland. The studying of a common language was considered as a matter
mainly for Finns to tackle. So for Finns the studying of Swedish became the key to
the other Nordic countries.32
At the same time the command of Swedish, which so far had been taken for
granted among the Finnish educated classes, began to decline. Although Swedish
continued to hold its position in the curriculum of secondary schools as the second
domestic tongue the all too common negative attitude adopted towards it prevented
most people from gaining a real command of the language. The question involved
difficult matters of principle, some ultra-Finnish scholars for example—who had
28 Member roll of Norden, Association for Nordic cooperation in Finland. Norden Association collection,
National Archives, Helsinki.
29 Ehrnrooth, op. cit., pp. 329-330; Nielsen, vol. 3., pp. 379-380.
30 Nordisk Tidskrift (1927), pp. 283-287; 336-338, 402; Nielsen, vol. 3, pp. 379-380.
31 Nordisk Tidskrift (1927), pp. 331-332; Nielsen, vol. 3, p. 379.
32 B. J. Bergqvist "Nordisk samarbete i skolans värld", Nordisk Tidskrift (1926), pp. 9-11.
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actually mastered the Swedish language—were not willing to use any tongue other
than Finnish at Nordic conferences held in Finland as at the Nordic Conference of
Economists held in Helsinki in 1930.33
In spite of these problems the Norden Association became also in Finnish eyes an
organization which enabled important cultural cooperation to be carried on and its
members to become acquainted with other countries and their inhabitants.
Soon after Finland had joined the Norden Association it launched a journal
"Nordisk Tidskrift" (The Nordic Periodical), an organ of high standard.34 So far as
general information was concerned a special booklet was also published in 1928.
The articles included contributions by well-known personalities from cultural life.
One of the Finnish pieces was written by F. E. Sillanpää, the future winner of the
Nobel-prize for literature, whose nationalistic sentiments, however, proved some-
what unacceptable to the Scandinavian editors of the booklet. They demanded
alterations and the delicate task of procuring these was finally left to the unfortunate
Finnish editor.35 The joint Nordic songbook compiled by the Norwegian Norden
Association also aimed at promoting a feeling of solidarity. Each country was
represented by twenty songs and care had been taken to recognize the linguistic
division in Finland for in the Finnish selection ten songs were in Finnish and ten in
Swedish.36
Great expectations were focussed especially on youth, and for that reason the
arranging of school trips was encouraged and large Nordic school meetings were
organized. The first of these was held in Helsinki and among the participants were
100 Norwegian school children.37 In order to make tourism in general easier there
was a proposal to end the compulsory carrying of passports between the Nordic
countries. In practice this had already been abolished so far as traffic between
Sweden and Denmark was concerned. According to Hj. J. Procopé, the Finnish
Minister for Foreign Affairs, similar procedures could be adopted for the traffic
between Finland and Sweden in those particular cases where the tourist was staying
in the other country only for a short time and had bought a return ticket. All the
Nordic countries agreed about the ending of the visa requirement but the use of
passports remained normal procedure.38 The visa requirement was, in fact abo-
33 Hämäläinen, op. cit., pp. 171 — 180; Finnish Envoy in Oslo Östen Elfving to Foreign Minister Hj. J.
Procopé 30 April 1930. Procopés coll., National Archives. Helsinki.
34 Nordisk Tidskrift för vetenskap, konst och industri. Utgiven av Letterstedska Föreningen. That periodical
was originally founded already 1878 by bequest of Jacob Letterstedt. It had, however, quite a small group
of subscribers until connection to Norden Associations. Nils Herlitz, "Nordisk Tidskrift under femtio år",
Nordisk Tidskrift (1927), pp. 558-587.
35 F. E. Sillanpää, Ikuinen Pohjola. Manuscript. Secretary of Swedish Norden Association V. Langleth
to Stenroth 21 April 1927; Chairman of the Norwegian Norden Association J. M. Lund to Stenroth 5 Jan.
1928; Prof. Y. Him to Stenroth 12 Jan. 1928. Otto Stenroths correspondence 1927-28. Norden
Association Collection, F. C. 1. National Archives. Helsinki.
36 Nordens sangbok. Utgitt av Foreningerne Norden i Danmark, Island, Norge og Sverige (Oslo, 1928).
37 Norden, Norsk forening for nordisk samarbeide. Årsberetning for 1926. Norden Association Coll., E.
a. b. 1. Norway 1927. National Archives. Helsinki.
38 Procope to Stenroth 14 Aug. 1928. Otto Stenroths correspondence 1928. Norden Association Coll. F.
C. 1. National Archives. Helsinki.
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lished in 1928 and the Nordic tourists card came into use instead. From now on
Nordic roundtours also began to be organized.39
Further investments in young people and the future were made by way of a
revision of history textbooks. The aim was to eliminate misleading information and
ultranationalistic attitudes. Obviously this involved a reexamination of many
famous disputes from the past and they were indeed numerous. The Norwegians
had begun this process as early as 1919 and on their initiative a committee was
established by the Norden Association in the 1920's to carry out such a revision in
practice the results being published in 1937.40 In this connection it is worth
mentioning also the Nordic seminars for teachers of history.41
For Finland, however, there still remained at least one bone of contention. The
language dispute at Helsinki University, which had been in abeyence for some years
gained strength once more in the charged atmosphere of the early 1930's. Anticom-
munist agitation had started at the end of 1929 in the Ostrobothnian municipality of
Lapua and before long there had developed a movement which strongly resembled
the semi-fascist movements to be found in Central Europe and in the Baltic
countries although in the beginning the question of nationality remained in the
background. The reason for the flare-up over the language question in 1930 was a
remark made to the press by Rolf Lagerborg, an eminent Swedish-speaking scholar,
during a visit to Sweden. When he was asked about what was going on in Finland
Lagerborg had jokingly asked if it was tactful to remind him of the country he had
come from when he had only a few days in which to enjoy the company of better
people. This utterance received currency also in Finland and Finnish-speaking
students organized a concert of whistles and catcalls in front of Lagerborg's home.
Because Lagerborg had recently applied for the chair of philosophy a "street
parliament"—that is another student mass meeting—declared him unfit to teach
at Helsinki University and Lagerborg indeed was not appointed on the pretext that
insufficient funds were available, for it was claimed that the state at that particular
moment could not afford the foundation of new professorships.
In mid-February 1931 the Agrarian Party, which had close links with the Lapua
movement, proposed complete finnification of Helsinki University and extended
that demand to apply also to the Technical University of Helsinki. The position of
the Swedish-speakers was strengthened, however, by opposition to this proposal
from the National Progress Party as well as by divisions on the issue within the
National Coalition Party (Conservative). This involved struggle with all its demon-
strations continued for many years. So far as Finnish connections with the other
Nordic countries were concerned the struggle over language produced a disturbingly
negative reaction there. Being concerned about the rights of the Swedish-
39 Nielsen, vol. 3, p. 328.
40 Nordens Idrobocker i historia. Ömsesidig granskning verkställd av Föreningama Nordens facknämnder.
Föreningama Nordens historiska publikationer, vol. 1. (Helsinki, 1937).
41 Nielsen, vol. 3, p. 380.
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speaking population and the status of the Swedish language in Finland, in the
autumn of 1934, 758 university teachers from Sweden, Norway, Denmark and
Iceland delivered to the Finnish envoys in each country a petition appealing for the
preservation of the Swedish language. This was a private petition and it did not
have governmental support in the respective countries42 but still such a plea from
Scandinavia infuriated Finnish nationalists and it was labelled as a shameful
interference in Finland's internal affairs. Circles especially concerned with Finnish-
Scandinavian relations including Field Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim, Rafael
Erich, the Finnish Envoy to Stockholm and J. K. Paasikivi, the leader of the
National Coalition Party, all appealed for moderation.43
At the end of 1935 the struggle over language began to die down. By the time a
new law was passed concerning the University of Helsinki. At the end of 1937 the
political and security situation in Europe generally as well as in Finland and other
Nordic countries had so changed that the debate on the law was carried on with
much less acrimony than previously. According to this new law the university
would have fifteen Swedish-speaking professorships but the administrative lan-
guage was to be solely Finnish.44
5. Finland's Nordic orientation
The public disputes over the language of Helsinki University concealed deeper
undercurrents of common concern to Finland and Sweden, for alarming changes in
the international situation soon forced responsible leaders to search means of
increasing the security of Finland.
Already in 1928 Hj. J. Procopé, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs advocated
Nordic orientated efforts towards economic and political cooperation. In the begin-
ning, however, his statements were not taken seriously enough in the Foreign Office
in Stockholm.45 Procope repeated his opinions about the necessity for cooperation
in a speech delivered in the Finnish parliament on December 9th 1930.46
Throughout her independence Finland had been anxious about her defensive
capability; even so armaments were still insufficient. In order to strengthen her
position a programme for the basic provisioning of the defence forces, known as the
42 Hämäläinen, op. cit., pp. 194-217; Jutikkala, op. cit., pp. 162-175; M. Klinge, Studenter och idéer.
Studentkåren vid Helsingfors universitet 1928-1960, vol. 4 1917-1960 (Tavastehus, 1979), pp. 156-163;
O. Mustelin, De nordiska universitetsadressena 1934. Skandinaviska och finlandssvenska opinioner
(Helsingfors, 1981), passim.
43 Hämäläinen, op. cit., pp. 210, 217 — 253; K. Selén, Genevesta Tukholmaan. Suomen
turvallisuuspolitiikan painopisteen siirtyminen Kansainliitosta pohjoismaiseen yhteistyöhön 1931 — 1936
(Historiallisia tutkimuksia, julk. Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 94. Helsinki, 1974), pp. 228-230; M.
Jakobson, Paasikivi Tukholmassa. J. K. Paasikiven toiminta Suomen lähettiläänä Tukholmassa 1936—39
(Keuruu, 1978), pp. 20—23, 42 — 46.
44 Hämäläinen, op. cit., pp. 257-260.
45 Procopé to general Linder in April 1929. Copy in Procope's collection, National Archives. Helsinki. V.
M. Carlgren, Varken—eller. Reflexioner kring Sveriges Ålandspolitik 1938-1939 (Uddevalla,  1977), pp.
30-31. Cf. also Bernt Schiller, "At Gun Point", Scandinavian Journal of History, vol. 9:3 (1984).
46 Finnish Parliamentary Records, minutes 1930, pp. 570-571.
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Emergency Programme, was promulgated in 1931. Sweden was approached and
asked to supply armaments, but nothing came of it, for Swedish governments were
cautious.47 However, among the General Staff of the Swedish army there existed an
active group from the beginning of 1930's which considered a Swedish-Finnish
military alliance to be the best guarantee of Swedish security. It is significant from
the point of view of future developments that this group created a good relationship
with officers of the Finnish General Staff.48
Meanwhile disarmament negotiations were being held in Geneva. In these
Finland had taken a different line from Sweden and other Nordic countries, but
during the negotiations attention was paid to possible forms of cooperation, particu-
larly between Finland and Sweden.49
The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rickard Sandier, had a positive
attitude towards such cooperation, positive even to the point where it could be said
he was drawing Finland into it. The first actual steps towards the warming of
Swedish-Finnish relations were taken in the early spring of 1934 when Sandier
invited his Finnish colleague Antti Hackzell to Stockholm and this was soon
followed by a return visit by Sandier to Helsinki. The negotiations coincided with
changes in certain political attitudes to security in Sweden. A positive atmosphere
prevailed in these discussions and according to Sandier Finland undoubtedly was
turning towards the rest of the Nordic countries.
Finland had indeed chosen already the line to be taken. The Foreign Minister
Hackzell belonged to those mainly conservative politicians who did not want to seek
support from Germany because of the possible risks involved. Finland was already
about to be drawn into the field of tension between Germany and the Soviet-Union,
a position from which she wished to extricate herself by any means possible. The
Soviet Press had launched an anti-Finnish campaign making injurious claims
concerning the neutrality of its neighbour. The supporters of the Nordic orientation
hoped that Finnish endeavours to establish her political neutrality would gain more
credibility if Finland were recognized all over the world to be linked with the
Scandinavian countries, whose will for peace was beyond doubt in all quarters.
Other active supporters for this orientation besides Hackzell were Field Marshal
Mannerheim and Väinö Tanner, the leader of the Finnish Social-Democratic Party.
However, Mannerheim did not speak of the Nordic but the Swedish orientation.
And to a large extent the concept of the Nordic orientation was indeed only a cover
for Finland's real aim, closer cooperation with Sweden. Tanner was sent over to
Stockholm to make secret soundings as he had excellent relations with the Social
Democratic leadership in Sweden and thus also with the Swedish government.'"
47 Selén, op. cit., pp. 132-143, 255-263.
4B Carlgren, op. cit., pp. 19—25; Antingen—eller. Freds- och försvarsproblem i saklig belysning, edited by
Helge Jung (Stockholm, 1930), passim.
49 Selén, op. cit., pp. 135-140.
50 Selen, op. cit., pp. 142—144; Jakobson, op. cit., pp. 14—21; Väinö Tanner, Kahden maailmansodan
välissä. Muistelmia 20-ja 30- luvuilta (Helsinki, 1966), pp., 167-177.
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An official declaration on Nordic orientation was expedited when the Soviet
Envoy to Helsinki on behalf of his government informed the then Prime Minister T.
M. Kivimäki in the summer of 1935 that the Soviet Union might be obliged to
occupy some parts of Finland to secure her own safety should war in Europe break
out. The declaration concerning Nordic orientation was made on December 5th
1935. With this in mind it was felt necessary to send a man of the highest prestige as
an envoy to Stockholm and for that post was chosen J. K. Paasikivi, bank director
and counsellor of state.51
Although the declaration in question was unilateral and did not bind the other
Nordic countries it made it easier for Finland to claim to form part of a joint front at
a time when the weakness of the League of Nations was becoming all too obvious.
The Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs was invited to a meeting of his Nordic
colleagues held in Oslo in August 1935 and participated in such meetings regularly
from then onwards. The Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Halvdan Koht
adopted a positive attitude to Finland's wish to operate as part of the Nordic front.
Soon after the declaration Finland had to consider—like the Scandinavian coun-
tries and other states neutral in the First World War—whether or not to abandon
the sanctions of the League of Nations in the political situation following the
occupation of the Rhineland and the dissolving of the Locarno Pact. On 1st July
1936 the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the Nordic countries jointly declared
that they did not consider the article on sanctions as binding but would each judge
whether to use them in any particular case.52 Two years later the attempt to escape
from the League of Nations' security system—which had proved inefficient—
became even more obvious when the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Belgium
and Luxembourg totally dissociated themselves from the article on sanctions in the
"Declaration of Seven Nations" on July 24th 1938.53
It was important for Finland to emphasize by every means her association with
|the Nordic countries. Indeed she worked very actively and enterprisingly within the
(framework of the revived Nordic Delegation for Economic Cooperation. This joint
agency was established at the end of 1934 on the initiative of the national Norden
Associations; the original idea coming from the Swedish Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Sandier. Its aim was on the one hand to stimulate trade between the Nordic
countries and on the other hand to run commercial information service directed at
other countries. Each particular Nordic country was represented by a very disting-
uished delegation drawn from its political and commercial elite and joint meetings
51 Jakobson, op. cit., pp. 14—15; K. Korhonen, Turvallisuuden pettäessä. Suomi neuvostodiplomatiassa
Tartosta talvisotaan 2. (Helsinki, 1971), pp. 121 -128; Selén, op. cit., pp. 226-255. After this article was
written the Finnish northern orientation has been dealt with in the dissertation thesis by Timo Soikkanen,
"Kansallinen eheytyminen — myytti vai todellisuus? Ulko- ja sisäpolitiikan linjat ja vuorovaikutus
Suomessa vuosina 1933—1939", (Juva, 1984). He sees this orientation as the outcome of an interaction
between domestic and foreign policy.
52 Selén, op. cit., pp. 144-155, 200-225.
53 L. Kaukiainen, Småstater i världskrisens skugga. Säkerhetsfrågan i den offentliga debatten i Sverige,
Finland och Danmark oktober 1937—november 1938 (Historiallisia tutkimuksia 112,julk. Suomen
Historiallincn Seura, Helsinki, 1980), pp. 111-121.
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were held regularly. As part of the work of the information service an important
book "The Northern Countries in World Economy: Denmark—Finland—Ice-
land—Norway—Sweden" was published in October 1937 in English—and later
on in Finnish and Swedish—to throw light on the economic life of the Nordic
countries. As editor-in-chief it had a Finn, docent Bruno Suviranta. Later the book
became a standard textbook for study groups working in different Nordic countries
with the aid of radio. In this connection an experimental series of radio talks
"Norden och världen" (The Nordic countries and the world) was launched by the
Nordic broadcasting companies under the auspices of the League of Nations in
1938.54
A recognition of the need for joint actions in relation to the rest of the world was
particularly illustrated by the launching of the semi-official Nordic periodical "Le
Nord". Its initiator was a Danish journalist and writer Carl Thalbitzer. The
venture soon gained support from a number of members of the Nordic Delegation
for Economic Cooperation and before long it gained also the approval of the Nordic
governments. The journal was aimed specifically at the needs of the outside world
and leading decision makers outside the Nordic countries. The articles were pub-
lished in English, French or German. The first issue came out in July 1938,
conveniently on the eve of the Declaration of Seven States.55
Soon the time arrived when "War or Peace?" became a constant newspaper
headline and Hitler's Germany escalated her policy of aggression. In September
1938, more specifically in the days preceding the Munich Agreement, Sweden and
Finland were approaching agreement on a programme of practical cooperation for
the safeguarding of the Aland Islands.56
The issue of the neutralized and demilitarized Aland Islands, a military vacuum,
had been raised publicly from time to time, for example in 1934. The question of
defending the archipelago was intimately connected with Swedish defence plans, for
in wrong hands the islands could become "a pistol pointing at the heart of Sweden"
in the words of a phrase inherited from the 19th century. The fortification of the
Aland Islands offered a suitably concrete area of cooperation for strengthening the
Nordic orientation of Finland. The matter was discussed for the first time at official
level in the early spring of 1937 during negotiations between the Finnish and
Swedish Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and as a result of these talks the Swedish
Defence Staff began preparations. The issue of fortifications became the subject of
public discussion at the beginning of the year 1938 and opinions were divided. At
official level the plan made further progress after the occupation of Austria by the
54 L. Kaukiainen, Joint Information Services as a Nordic Answer in Crisis of the 1930s {Finnish
Historical Society. Studia Historica,vol. 12, Helsinki, 1983), pp. 22-30. On 22. Nov. 1930 in Oslo a
convention was signed by Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, who
bound themselves not to raise custom duties without informing the other parties at least two weeks in
advance. This Oslo agreement came into force in February 1932 and Finland joined it in November 1933.
The main commercial problems between the Nordic countries were not solved by agreement, however.
55 Kaukiainen, op. cit. (1983), pp. 30-42.
56 Kaukiainen, op. cit. 1980), pp. 173-188, 216-224; Carlgren, op. cit., 67-134.
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Germans at the end of March 1938. In April it was agreed to start secret negotia-
tions about the possible partial dismantling of the demilitarization policy. At the
end of the summer some information about these talks started to filter through to the
public and the governments in Finland and in Sweden had to make public
announcements on the subject at the beginning of September. Final agreement on
fortification was reached at negotiations in Stockholm at the beginning of 1939. The
military results of this Stockholm Convention were that Finland was given the right
to pursue all types of military activities in the southern part of the neutral zone. The
size of the territory covered by the 1921 demilitarization pact would thus be
permanently altered. In addition Finland was granted in the northern part of the
zone a temporary authority for ten years to pursue certain limited military activities,
about which she should negotiate separately with Sweden. The Finnish government
gave a detailed commitment to protect the privileges of the Aland Islanders, and
this was the subject of a separate announcement.57
The only thing remaining was to get the consent of the signatory states and the
Soviet Union. Nor as yet had the Aland Islanders themselves given their approval.
The consent of the first was gained relatively quickly but the stumbling block
proved to be the Soviet Union, from whom a positive attitude was hoped for but a
negative stand was feared by the negotiators. Indeed a secret Soviet emissary had
already in April 1938 approached the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Accord-
ing to him the Soviet Union could give its consent to the plans only if they were to get
in return some concessions of actual territories. This suggestion, however, the
government of Finland was unable to entertain. The plan for the fortification of the
Aland Islands finally collapsed at the end of May 1939 after Sweden had brought up
the issue for discussion at the League of Nations. The Soviet Union presented her
objections and Sweden withdrew her proposal. In spite of some attempts to reopen
the issue of the Aland Islands it never again appeared on the agenda of the joint
negotiations.
In the course of the year 1939 it became obvious that in spite of all efforts Nordic
political and military cooperation had little basis in reality. Particularly clearly this
could be seen after the outbreak of the Second World War when Finland was invited
to talks in Moscow in October 1939. The Nordic sister nations certainly offered
genuine sympathy but that did not count for much once Finland found herself at
war with the Soviet Union on November 30th 1939. A meeting of the Nordic heads
of state was meant to be an impressive demonstration in support of Finland but in
fact it turned out to be the funeral of Nordic political cooperation.59
When assessing Nordic cooperation as a whole, however, and in particular
57 K. Wahlbäck, Finlandsfrågan i svensk politik (Stockholm, 1967) Veljeys veitsen terällä. Suomen
kysymys Ruotsinpolitiikassa 1937-1940 (Porvoo, 1968),passim; Kaukiaincn, op. cit. (1980), pp. 156-172,
217-234.
58 Carlgren, op. cit., pp. 131-175; Jakobson, op. cit., 70-85; A.Johansson, Finlands sak. Svensk polilik och
opinion under vinterkriget 1939—1940. (Sverige under andra världskriget, Uddevalla, 1973), pp. 20—31.
59 Korhonen, op. cit., pp. 201—204; Johansson, op. cit., pp. 46—86; M. Jakobson, The Diplomacy of the
Winter-War. An Account of the Russo- Finnish Conflict, 1930—1940. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press, 196\), passim.
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Finland's role in the picture, things were not so gloomy. Even if the Nordic countries did
not form a fortress in which to seek shelter during difficult times and even if they were
incapable of rescuing Finland, Norway and Denmark from the ordeals of the Second
World War they still helped in building a spiritual defence with the aid of which their
hardships became easier to endure.
Intercourse between the Nordic countries and the attendant cooperation in cultural
and economic fields was to prove fruitful later on, and its beneficial results are still felt
today.
When considering her spiritual qualities and social structure Finland already
belonged clearly among the Nordic countries before gaining her independence.
 Because of the delivery pains of the new independent state she was still not very
active in her approach towards the Nordic countries in the 1920's. However, when
the world had proved to be a less secure place in the 1930's Finland herself actively
sought contacts with the other Nordic countries, and especially in less formal,
non-governmental areas her contribution was a significant one.
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